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COMMENTS
CONTEMPT OF COURT IN FLORIDA
INTRODUCTION

The power of the courts to punish for contempt is apparently part
of the western judicial system. It has been so in Florida at least since
the Nineteenth Century. The reason for this power is seen in an early
case' in which a contemnor refused to testify after being ordered to do so.
After holding the court's order lawful the Supreme Court concluded:
".. . the court may resort to all measures given by the law to compel
obedience thereto. I-laving given petitioner an opportunity to be heard,
the court had the inherent right to punish, as for a contempt, a violation
of its order to maintain its dignity, authority, and efficiency in the proper
2
administration of the law."1
That such power exists without legislative aid was clearly enunciated
in In re Hayes," when the court said: "The Supreme Court has, independent
of statutory authority, inherent power to punish for contempt of court."4
But the Florida Legislature has by statute declared that the courts, both
civil and criminal, have the power to punish contempts, and has, in
addition, defined the act itself. The following sections of Florida Statutes
(1951), are applicable to this subject:
§ 38.22 Power to punish
Every court nay punish contcmpts against it, but the punishmeat imposed by a justice of the peace shall not exceed twenty
dollars fine or twenty-four hours imprisonment.
§ 38.23 Contempts defined
A refusal to obey any legal order, mandate or decree, made
or given by any judge either in term time or in vacation relative
to any of the business of said court, after due notice thereof, shall
be considered a contempt, and punished accordingly. But nothing
said or written, or published, in vacation, to or of any judge, or
of any decision made by a judge, shall in any case be construed
to be a contempt.
§ 932.03 Contempts
Said courts, in the exercise of their criminal jurisdiction may
punish for contempts as in the exercise of their civil jurisdiction,
and the criminal courts of record shall possess, in this respect,
the same powers as the circuit courts.
1. Ex parte Beville, 58 Fla. 170, 50 So. 685 (1909).
2. Id. at 184, 50 So. at 689.

3. 72 Fla. 558, 73 So. 362 (1916).
4. Id. at 568, 73 So. at 365.
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Recognizing the statutory authority granted in Section 38.22, F.S.
(1951), the court in State ex rel. Giblin v. Sullivan5' pointed out again
that the courts have both inherent and statutory powers to punish
contempts, Even more recently the court has taken notice of this statutory
grant, but stated: "A grant of power to a court is tempting but the
acknowledgement of it presupposes the authority to withdraw same. As
we have said, the power to punish contempt is a necessary and inherent
one in a court. Therefore we take notice of the statute but decline to
place a construction upon it,"
CLASSIFICATIONS

OF CONTEMPT

Having concluded that the power to punish contempts is not only
necessary but also an inherent and legislatively authorized power, it is
important to notice that there are several classifications of contempt.7
The classic definitions in Florida were laid down in the landmark case of
Ex parte Earman,8 as follows:
An offense against the authority or the dignity of a court or judicial
officer when acting judicially is called contempt of court, a species
of criminal conduct. Contempts may be direct or indirect or
constructive, or criminal or civil according to their essential nature.
Contempts of court are committed against courts and judicial
officers who are vested with a portion of 'the judicial power of the
State,' when judicial functions are interferred with or impugned
by the contemptuous acts or conduct. A direct contempt is an
insult committed in the presence of the court or of a judge when
acting as such, or a resistance of or an interference with the
lawful authority of the court or judge in his presence, or improper
conduct so near to the court or judge acting judicially as to
interrupt or hinder judicial proceedings. This species of contempt
may be punished at once and summarily by the court that is
offended, in order to maintain its authority and dignity, but the
punishment must be appropriate to the offense and not excessive.
An indirect or constructive contempt is an act done, not in the
presence of a court or of a judge acting judicially, but at a distance
under circumstances that reasonably tend to degrade the court or
the judge as a judicial officer, or to obstruct, interrupt, prevent,
or embarrass the administration of justice by the court or judge.
A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the
authority and dignity of a court or [of a judge acting judicially
as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or dignity
of the court or judge or in doing a duly forbidden act.]
A civil contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to
be done by a court or judge in a civil case for the benefit of the
opposing party therein.'
5. 157 Fla. 463, 26 So.2d 509 (1946).
6. State ex rel. Franks v. Clark, 46 So.2d 488, 489 (Fla. 1950),
7. See Courts--Constructive Criminal Contempt. 7 MIAMI L.Q 253, for a
discussion of the classes of contempt generally.
8. 85 Fla. 297, 95 So. 755 (1923).
9. Id. at 315, 95 So. at 760.
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An example of these distinctions in the actual context of a case is
seen in the following words of the court:
The petitioner has been found guilty of an indirect civil contempt.
[He had failed to pay alimony under a divorce decree.] It was
indirect because it was not in the presence of the court and because
proof thereof was necessary in order that the chancellor be adivsed
of the facts going to the determination of the contempt.
It was civil because it was for the benefit of the wife and the
chancellor's order was for coercive purposes, to wit: Perform his
obligations to his wife, relative to maintenance and support. 10
As noted in these quotations contempt of court may be direct or
indirect, civil or criminal. In addition, some note must be taken whether
the action was in equity or at law. We may summarize this section on
classification and definition by referring to the language of the court in
Ex parte Crews:11
It may be said broadly, but certainly, that any act which is
calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct the court in the
administration of justice, or which is calculated to lessen its
authority or its dignity is a contempt.
The test is not the physical propinquity of the act to the court,
but its tendency to directly affect the administration of justice.12
CoNTF_.PT PROCEEDINGS

Initiating a contempt proceeding
Where there has been a direct, criminal contempt of court, as pointed
out in the Earman case,' 3 the court may punish summarily. But where
the action alleged contemptuous is indirect, whether civil or criminal,
a petition is usually made to the court for the judge to issue a rule to
show cause (rule nisi) why the alleged contemnor should not be adjudged
in contempt. A hearing is had upon the rule where there is a return or
answer. The discretion of the court in initiating such proceedings has
been excepted to in one situation in the case of On" v. Orr 1 where the
Circuit Court of Dade County was requested by the alleged contemnor's
former wife to adjudge her divorced spouse to be in contempt of court
for not obeying a final decree and paying the wife's attorneys' fees. The
Supreme Court heard the case on the wife's appeal, when the rule nisi
was discharged by the circuit court after a hearing. The court said:
As a general rule an applicant is not entitled-as a matter of rightto an order for commitment of a person for contempt, but the
application is addressed to the discretion of the court.
The rule, however, is different where the person, sought to be
cited for contempt, wilfully refuses to comply with the order of
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

State ex tel. Carroll v. Sullivan, 160 Fla. 115, 117, 33 So.2d 735 736 (1948)
127 Fla. 381, 173 So. 275 (1937).
Id. at 389, 173 So. at 279.
See note 8 suTra.
141 Fla. 112, 192 So. 466 (1939).
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the court commanding him to pay alimony, costs and attorneys'
fees ....
It inevitably follows, then, that such an arrant noncompliance
with the order of the court in the final decree allowing costs

and attorneys' fees may be made grounds for an adjudgment of
contempt of court and the application for citation in such a case
is not addressed to the discretion of the court, but is a matter of
rifght to those who have a pecuniary interest in the enforcement
of the decree. 15
Thus it has been said generally that the rule is not a pleading, but
merely process founded upon a motion and affidavits. If the affidavits
or motion were defective or the showing made for issuing the rule was
insufficient, the proper practice was to move to discharge or to quash the
rule, and a demurrer could not have been entertained. 6
Limitations on the court
The determination of whether or not an act is contemptuous will
often depend upon the substantive law and the rights of the party. As
we shall see later, many actions arc privileged and these cannot therefore
be held contemptuous. Further, the court is limited to contempts affecting
it alone. In one case a circuit court issued rule to show cause to one
7
who failed to pay alimony under the decree of the court of another county.'
The party petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition which
was granted. The court noted:
a court is not authorized to require respecting or to punish
contempt of any other courts or tribunal unless the latter be an
agency or a part of the court in which the contempt is charged.
The contempt must, therefore, be recognized as a contempt of the
court proposing to inflict the punishment and judgment for contempt. The power to punish is an incident for maintaing its
authority . - '
The same rule is true regarding statutes. In Ex partc Turner,", the
court adjudged in contempt those who secured the release of one sent to
jail by the Circuit Court of Columbia County for aggravated assault. The
Supreme Court discharged the contemnors because the sentence and
custody of a prisoner is regulated by statute and not judicial order, thus
interference with the prisoner's custody was a violation of state regulations
only, and not a contempt of court.
Appeal
The history of appeal and review from an adjudication of contempt
in Florida has been one of significant change. The early view is well
expressed in the following excerpts:
-

15. Id. at 116, 192 So. at 467.
16. Continental Nat. Building & Loan Ass'n v. Scott, 40 Fla. 386, 24 So.
473 (1898).
17. State ex rel. Sherman v. Thomas, 128 Ra. 231, 174 So. 413 (1937).
18. Id. at 235, 174 So. at 415.
19. 73 Fla. 360, 74 So. 314 (1917).
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In the absence of any statutory limitations or restrictions, the
power of the several courts over 'contempts' is omnipotent, and
its exercise is not to be enquired into by any other tribunal. This
is the great bulwark established by the comnmon law for the
protection of its courts of justice, and for the maintenance of their
dignity, authority and efficiency, and neither in England nor in

the United20 States has this unrestricted power been seriously
questioned.

An appeal will not lie in such case [fine for contempt in disregard-

ing an injunction], as matters of contempt of the authority of a
court are entirely within the province of the court adjudging the
same, and not subject to be reviewed upon writ of error or appeal.2 1
Of course, this view did not mean that once contempt had been
adjudged the matter was entirely closed, regardless of the facts. But the
rule against opening the case by collateral attack was rather strict. In
Palmer v. Palmner,2 2 the court said in dictum:
We may remark that, where the judgment is void, as for want
of jurisdiction of the court, the remedy is by habeas corpus, and
where it is merely irregular
or erroneous there is no appeal or
23
other right of review.
24
The same rule was given in the landmark case of Ex parte Senior
where the court stated:
As a general rule, habeas corpus does not lie to correct mere
irregularities of procedure where there is jurisdiction; and in order
to sustain the writ there must be illegality, or want of jurisdiction.25
Although this rule seems firmly embedded in early Florida law, a
different result was reached in Sanchez v. Sanchez, 26 which involved a
divorce bill in equity. Appellant had filed the bill, but by ex parte hearings,
of which he had no notice and at which he made no appearance, he was
required to pay alimony. Failing to so pay he was held in contempt of
the Circuit Court of Levy County. His appeal was taken. Five years
27
later the dissenting pudge in Florida Central Peninsular Ry. v. Williams
believed it necessary to discuss the earlier case. The facts here, were that
the defendant was enjoined from laying certain railroad track. It was
found in contempt, assessed fines and ordered to remove the track laid
in violation of the injunction. The defendant company appealed. Citing
the Caro caseC2 the court said that "An appeal does not lie from an order
of the circuit court imposing fine for a contempt in violating an injunction. '29 It went on to state that it considered the fines and the order
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Ex parte Edwards, 11 Fla. 174 (1867).
Caro v. Maxwell, 20 Fla. 17 (1883).
28 Fla. 295, 9 So. 657 (1891).
Id.at 300, 9 So. at 658.
37 Fla. 1, 19 So. 652 (1896).
Id. at 14, 19 So. at 653.
21 Fla. 346 (1885).
45 Fla. 295, 33 So. 991 (1903).
See note 21 supra,
Ibid.
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both to be punitive and subject only to collateral attack by habeas corpus.
But the dissenting judge claimed that removal of the track was remedial
and under the Sanchez case an appeal would lie.
rflhis point of contention concerning the remedial or punitive nature
of a decree is apparently not discussed elsewhere as such. However, the
differentiation between civil and criminal contempts which may depend
upon the remedial nature of a decree and its subsequent violation remains
very much in evidence.
The decision in the Sanchez ease was certainly overlooked when the
court held in a 1913 case 0 that an appeal does not lie from an order
punishing a party for contempt for the violation of an injunction granted
in a chancery cause. The court concluded, "The remedy, if any, is habeas
corpus for an illegal imprisonment.," '
32
Even more broad was the language of the court in Miller v.Miller
where it said:
In such cases appeal does not lie from a commitment or fine for
violating, or for refusal to comply with, an order of the court
made in due course and within the jurisdiction of the court.
(emphasis supplied) 18
The tenacity with which the court has clung to the presumption
of propriety in the action of the trial court cannot be overstated. It is
clearly seen in a 1930 case3 4 where the court stated that if the trial judge
makes a statement as to the facts before him, they shall be regarded as
an absolute verity.
The principle that habeas corpus proceedings afford the only proper
remedy is restated in the case of Jones v. King.3 5 The Supreme Court
admonished the circuit court for summarily denying habeas corpus, noting
that the only remedy for contempt was such a proceeding. But this by
no means infers that the decision of the lower court will be lightly set
aside, for we have already noted that such is not the case. Moreover,
the validity of our conclusion may be reinforced by the language of the
court in Richey v. McLeod:36
It is true that where the judgment in contempt clearly appears
to have been arbitrary and capricious it may be adjudged illegal
in habeas corpus proceedings but before such result obtains the
showing must be clear and unequivocal that the action of 3the
court
in imposing the judgment was arbitrary and capricious. 7
30. McCall v. Lee, 66 Fla. 14, 62 So. 902 (1913).
31. Id. at 16, 62 So. at 902.
32. 91 Fla. 82, 107 So. 251 (1926).
33. Id.at 83, 107 So. at 251.
34. State ex rel Grebstein v. Lehman, 100 Fla. 481, 129 So. 818 (1930).
35. 120 Fla. 87, 162 So. 353 (1935).
36. 137 Fla. 281, 188 So. 228 (1939).
37. Id. at 287, 188 So. at 230,
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However, by 1931 the court seemed to be saying that in cases of
civil contempt the action was reviewable, although it hinted that such
would not be the case with criminal contempt.38
The major change in this area did not occur until the Pennekamp
cases 3 of 1945, when the editor of a Miami paper and his publishing
company were both fined for printing two editorials and a cartoon. The
earlier of the two cases was to determine whether an appeal or certiorari
would lie. The court said:
Heretofore we have reviewed judgments in contempt by habeas
corpus. Such remedy is not applicable to this case inasmuch as
the judgment does not detain the appellants. Contempt proceedings are criminal in nature. Rule 37 of this Court provides
that appeals shall be taken in criminal cases in conformity to
Section 290, Florida Criminal Procedure Act, F.S.A. § 924.11.
We hold40 that appeal is the proper method to review the
judgment.
In the second case, the court conveniently gives a brief summary of
the history of procedural rules in contempt actions:
The early contempt cases to reach this. court were brought by
attachment as in England . . . In some of these cases it was
held that appeals would not lie . . . . Later their validity was
tested by habeas corpus ....
The practice in contempt has never
been regulated by statute in Florida as it is by Congress in the
Federal Courts. It has been regulated by the State Courts and
the regulation has been so satisfactory that the tendency of the
Legislature 41has been to extend rather than limit the power of
the courts.
After taking the view in the Pennekamp cases that the ordinary
procedure of appeal is open to one adjudged to be guilty of criminal
contempt and fined, it is only a matter of degree to say that when the
penalty is detention the same procedure should be available without resort
to the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus. However, in a recent case42
the Supreme Court heard a case upon petition for a writ of habeas corpus
where the petitioner had been adjudged in contempt by the Circuit Court
of Dade County for refusing to answer questions before the Dade County
Grand Jury regarding gambling activities although he was protected by the
state immunity statute. The petitioner was sentenced to six months in
jail. The questionability of resorting to the extraordinary writ is expressed
in the specially concurring opinion of Justice Paul D. Barns:
-

38. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Tampa Southern Ry., 101 Fla. 468, 134 So.
529 (1931).
39. Pennekamp v. State, 156 Fla. 227, 22 So.2d 875 (1945), rev'd on other
grounds, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Pennekamp v. Circuit Court of Dade County, 155 Fla.
489, 21 So.2d 41 (1945).
40. Pennekamp v. Circuit Court of Dade County, supra note 39.
41. Pennekamp v. State, 156 Fla. 227, 236, 22 So.2d 875, 880 (1945).
42. State ex ref. Mitchell v. Kelly, 71 So.2d 887 (1954).
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This habeas corpus proceeding instituted in this court is a
collateral attack on a judgment of criminal contempt. The judgment is final in its nature and the appropriate method of procuring
review is by 4appeal.
The necessity of resort to habeas corpus no
3
longer exists.
A more typical case under the modern procedure allowing appeal is
that of Clein v. State44 where a newspaper editor called before a grand jury
refused to reveal the sources for certain information he had printed. After
being held in contempt and ordered to confinement he appealed, and the
procedure was apparently acceptable for there was no discussion concerning it.

But some doubt still remains on the matter of appeal when the court
proceeds as it did in Petition of Campbell45' In that case a ward regaining
his sanity applied for an order requiring settlement of property in the
hands of his guardian. Failing to turn over the property, the guardian was
held in contempt and sentenced until she performed. However, another
judge of the same court set aside the contempt order. The ward appealed
but the Supreme Court ruled that certiorari was the proper procedure.
Nevertheless, even with the noted exceptions, the rule today apparently
is that an appeal will lie from an adjudication of contempt. It should be
noted collaterally, that appeals have been utilized even before this "new
rule," but in special cases only. For example, an appeal was taken by one
held in contempt for violating the order of a circuit court, when such
order was issued pursuant to a mandate from the Supreme Court. 46 The
court said: "This appeal is proper for our consideration because the order
which petitioner violated was entered pursuant to a mandate from this
court." 47 Under the Pennekamp rule the appeal was proper in any event.
Interlocutory appeals
It has been said that, "Orders of the Chancellor made in the course
of the hearing in determination of a contempt proceeding, but prior to a
decision in the contempt proceedings on its merits pursuant to a rule nisi,
are not appealable interlocutory orders within the purview of Section 4966,
49
C.G.L. ' 4 8 Earlier cases have expressed the same view.
These cases were reviewed in a 1948 case,"' and the court admitted
it was well aware that on the same facts as it was concerned with, there
could have been no review by certiorari. However, the court stated:
43. Id. at 897.

44. 52 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1950).
45. 72 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1954).
46. State Board of Funeral Directors v. Cooksey, 155 Fla. 761, 21 So.2d 542 (1945).
47. Id. at 765, 21 So.2d at 544.
48. Hamilton v. State ex tel Hamilton, 248 Fla. 551, 552, 4 So.2d 660, 660 (1941).
49. Culpepper v. Culpepper, 103 Fla. 390, 138 So. 799 (1931); Miller v. Miller,
91 Fla. 82, 107 So. 251 (1926).
50. State ex rel. Carroll v. Sullivan, 160 Fla. 11H5,33 So.2d 735 (1948).
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We now recede from that position and bold that such procedure
may be employed, a view which we consider justified by our Rule
No. 34, as follows:
(a) Interlocutory Appeals to Be by Certiorari. All appeals from
interlocutory decrees as authorized by statute including orders or
decrees after final decree, shall be prosecuted to this court by
certiorari. This rule shall not preclude the review of such orders
and decrees on final decree, if found more cxpedient."
Dissenting judges in the case felt that the most that they could agree
to would be that interlocutory appeal by certiorari is a concurrent remedy
with habeas corpus, but not exclusive. The decision seems to have been
followed very shortly thereafter, when a write of certiorari initiated the
52
review of an interlocutory decree in Yandell v. Yandell.
EVIDENCE

"A proceeding for contempt is a criminal proceeding in its nature
and is to be prosecuted by the rules governing criminal prosecution.",,a
Therefore, criminal contempts will have to be proven as any other crimes.
A problem arises since the general rule exists that the weight of evidence
and the credibility of witnesses will not be considered in habeas corpus
proceedings; but we have already noted, for a long time, that habeas corpus
was the only method of reviewing adjudications of contempt, and the court
would niot sit idly by, apathetic to contempt adjudgments lacking sufficient
evidence to support a criminal charge. Thus, where the charge of the
sole witness was unsupported, and the defendant corroborated his denial
of criminal intent, the evidence was considered, and the defendant remanded
for discharge unless legally sufficient evidence to support the charge could
be adduced.5 1 However, in a companion case, where the record amply
showed the verity and legal sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant was
remanded to custody. 5 Where contempt cases are still reviewed by habeas
corpus the same rules apply. 6
INTENT

The element of intent is very important in contempt cases. The court
noted this point when it said ",

.

. a process contempt commitment for

refusing to obey an order of court must be based on an affirmative finding
that it is within the power of the defendant to obey the order, and such
finding must be made to appear on the face of the order of commitment,
else it is void." 5 7 Thus, inability to perform would preclude a showing of
intent not to perform, necessary to constitute contempt. Further, where
a defendant appealed from a final decree enjoining his advertising in a
51. Id. at 117, 33 So.2d 736.
52. 160 11a. 164, 33 So.2d 869 (1948).

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Ex jrarte Crews, 127 Fla. 381, 388, 178 So. 275, 278 (1937).
Stokes v.Scott, 138 Fla. 235, 189 So. 272 (1939).
Williams v. Scott, 138 Fa. 239, 189 So. 274 (19391.
Marshall v. Clark, 45 So.2d 667 (Fla. 1950).
State ex rel. Trezevant v.McLeod, 126 Fla. 229, 230, 170 So. 735 (1936).
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certain fashion and continued advertising during the appeal, a contempt
order was reversed, for the judge found, "There was no intent to disobey
the order and I understand intention to be one of the elements of
contempt."5 8
The question that should next be considered is how the alleged
contemnor may rebut the contemptuous intent and the effect of his rebuttal.
The leading case in this area in Ex parte Earman50 wherein a municipal
court judge wrote a letter to a circuit court judge concerning habeas corpus
proceedings pending in the latter's court. The letter was held contemptuous,
but the contemnor was released after denying under oath the requisite
intent. The court felt that in the case of an indirect contempt which
involved the use of ambiguous words, the key factor is intent, and if such
intent be denied under oath it is sufficient to discharge the alleged
contemnor; for if he has perjured himself, a separate prosecution for
perjury will lie. That such oath, denying the intent, is conclusive where
there is ambiguity, was reaffirmed in another decision 0 handed down the
same day as was the Earman case.
Where the contempt consists of a continued doing of what was
commanded not to be done, by an injunction, the rule is, of course, not
applicable. 1 Further, where there is no ambiguity, that is, the words
or acts arc clear, the only question is if the words were said, or if the
02
act was done; an oath by the defendant is neither sufficient nor conclusive
In noting that denial of intent might be perjury we are led to the
interesting question, of when perjury equals contempt. We have at least
a partial answer in State ex rel. Luban v, Coleman"3 where the problem of
an untruthful witness, called by the state, was presented. The court established three tests: (1) the alleged false answers must be obstructive;
(2) there must have existed judicial knowledge of the falsity of the testimony;
(3) the question was pertinent. Where there is conflicting evidence as
to the falsity of the statements the proper course is prosecution for perjury
and not a direct contempt proceeding.
In Croft v. Culbreath,4 in 1942, the court tried to clarify an apparent
inconsistency in the holdings of the earlier cases, allowing discharge of
defendants upon denial of intent under oath, and the later cases, allowing
no discharge. It pointed out that the more recent cases merely demonstrated that if the overt act were admitted, it might of itself constiute
contempt, for the offender is presumed to have intended the aatural con58. Florida Ventilated Awning Co. v. Dickson, 67 So.2d 218, 219 (19531.
59. 85 Fla. 297, 95 So. 755 (1923).
60. Ex parte Biggers, 85 Fla. 322, 95 So. 763 (1923).
61. Ex parte Peaden, 88 Fla. 273, 102 So. 160 (1924).
62. Wilson v. Joughin, 105 Fla. 345, 353, 141 So. 178, 182 (1932); Baumgartner
v. Joughin, 105 Fla. 335, 141 So. 185 (1932).
63. 138 Fla. 555, 189 So. 713 (1939).
64. 150 Fla. 60, 6 So.2d 638 (1942).
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sequences of his act. In the older cases, where the action was ambiguous,
a denial of intent was sufficient.
Apparently speaking of a denial of the act itself, the court, in Ex parte
Maniscalco,6 1 said:
For the return under oath to operate as a discharge it must be
direct, specific, full and unequivocable. The failure to deny any
material act will render it ineffectual.
The rule applied in the Croft case, supra, is that the return must
be so specific in its language of denial that a charge of perjury
may be based thereon, if the denial be false. A general denial of
being guilty of contempt is not sufficient.66
Similarly, the court did not allow discharge for a return and answer
of denial under oath to rule nisi in State cx rel. Franks v. Clark.6 It stated
its position clearly, "The answer did not deny the acts charged. It only
denied the motive, hence the cited cases are not in point."68
TERM OF DETENTION

No set period is to be found in the cases for detaining the contemnor
when a jail sentence is ordered. But it is clear that one cannot be sentenced
to an indefinite term under the Florida Constitution. 9 In State ex rel.
Grebstein v. Lehman70 the circuit court judge who was offered $5,000 if
he decided a pending case for the defendant, Alphonse Capone, found
the contemnor in contempt and ordered "that he be committed to the
county jail of Dade County until further order of this court." This was
held to be an invalid commitment for lack of a definite term. However,
in the companion case under the same style,7' the court decided whether,
because of the impropriety of the punishment, the defendant would be
discharged or remanded was within the discretion of the Supreme Court,
and since the circuit court should fix its own punishments for contempts
before it, the defendant was remanded.
A defendant imprisoned for contempt of the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County for refusing to comply with a court order by paying alimony
was committed until he comply or until further order of the court.7 2 In
discharging the defendant, the Supreme Court said, ". . . the contempt
being in its nature a punishment for what the defendant has heretofore
done, is void because it specified no definite time of imprisonment." 73

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

153 Fla. 666. 15 So.2d 445 (1945).
Id. at 668, 15 So.2d at 446.
46 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1950).
Id. at 489.
F.A. CoNSF. DECLARATION OF RICHTS, § 8,

100 Fla. 473, 128 So. 811 (1930).
See note 34 supra.

72. See note 57 suTa.

73. Ibid.
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The court has similarly said, "The judgment is fatally defective because
it condemns the petitioner to imprisonment for an indefinite and indeterminate period,"7 ,where the judgment read as follows:
It is, therefore, ordered and decreed that the said Claude T.
Bearden shall be confined in the Sarasota County jail for a period
of--days, or until the said Claude T. Bearden shall purge himself
comply with the Court
for contempt of the Court for
75 his failure to
Order entered in this cause.
After reaffirming the above principles by stating that "The law is
well settled in this State that an order in contempt must be definite and
certain,' 70 the court has gone on to tell what is required:
The order should be so full and complete that no further direction
same
should be required by the executive officer to fully execute the
77
and also release the contemnor when the order is satisfied.
That this area of the law of contempts is certain, may also be seen
in the summary statement to be found in Avery v. Sinclair:78
The law is well settled in this state that where a contempt order is
predicated on a finding of past noncompliance with a court order,
and not on any present failure to comply therewith although able
so to do, the order, being in its nature a punishment for what the
contemnor has7 9 heretofore done, must specify a definite term of
imprisonment.
PURGING CONTEM PTS

Several of the sections previously discussed are refleceted in the
area of purging contempts. We have already seen when and how an oath
denying contemptuous intent will discharge an alleged contemnor. We
will not see if an apology or reparation will discharge an admitted contempt.
In a case involving contemptuous newspaper statements the court
said, "The apology offered for the mistake of fact contained in the
publication and the disclaimer of intent to reflect upon 'the acting judge'
do not deprive the publication of its contemptuous nature, and the judge
had authority to impose appropriate penalties for the contemptuous publication." '0 This case also held that even if a circuit court judge seated in
the criminal court of record was not properly assigned, he was still a judicial
officer of the state and hence had the authority to punish for a contempt.
Orr v. Orel noted that in cases where the contempt resulted from
failure to pay certain fees ordered by the court, the defendant might purge
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the contempt by a showing of inability to pay not caused by his own
neglect of misconduct.
In a case of failure to pay alimony the lower court said that the
defendant might purge himself of contempt and secure his release by
payment of the sum found owing and costs.8 2 The dissenting opinion in
another case 83 felt that prompt compliance after minor violations of a
court order was sufficient purging to discharge the contemnor.
When a contempt occurs in the course of a trial, the suit is interrupted
by the contempt proceedings. One may inquire as to what will then
4
happen. The answer is given by the court in Palm Shores, Inc. v. Nobles:
It appears to be the law that a party in contempt is not entitled
to insist upon a hearing or a trial of the case out of which the
contempt arose until he first purges himself of the contempt.
A party against whom a judgment of contempt is entered has the
right to purge himself of the contempt and thereupon to be reinstated to all his rights and privileges.85
CONTEMIPTUOUS

ACTs IN FLORIDA

Acts involving supersedeas
As early as 1869, an appointed receiver, who was to relinquish his
receivership during an appeal under supersedeas and failed to do so was
held in contempt of court. 86
In general the writ is considered ineffective before being prefected.
In Smith v. Whitfield," the plaintiff secured an injunction to stop the
defendants from removing phosphate rock. The injunction was dissolved
and before the plaintiff took his appeal and supersedeas was perfected, the
defendants sold rock to an innocent third party. Upon perfection of the
supersedeas and during the appeal, the plaintiff sought to have the defendants held in contempt for removing the rock. But the court held that
the third party obtained his rights before the supersedeas and the defendants
were therefore not guilty of contempt in satisfying such rights.
A similar situation arose where the defendant in a chancery cause was
enjoined from obtaining a tax deed to certain lands. He entered an appeal
from the interlocutor, decree which the circuit court judge ordered to
operate as a supersedeas. The defendant proceeded to obtain the deed.
The court in discharging the contempt noted that a supersedeas prevents,
for the time being, all proceedings to enforce an injunction appealed from,
or to punish for its violation during the pendency of the supersedeas.
Thus, the defendant did not violate the injunction. 8
82. Avery v. Sinclair, 153 Fla. 767, 1" So.2d 846 (1943).
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That we are still interested in intent inthese cases is seen in Strickland
v. Knight, 9 where a temporary injunction restraining county commissioners
from issuing a certain liquor license was dissolved. An appeal was taken
and supersedeas granted, suspending the effect of the order dissolving the
injunction. Pending the appeal, the commissioners, upon advice of counsel,
granted the permit and a rule to show cause issued. The court stated that
violation of a supersedeas which is as broad as an injunction would be
contemptuous, but since the defendants were acting in gobd faith and
meant no disrespect to the court, their only punishment was the cost of
the contempt proceeding.
Similarly, a rule nisi was quashed where an attorney had proceeded
improperly but apparently in good faith. The necessary facts arc contained
in the following excerpt:
We are convinced from the record in the involved case and the
allegations in the return that the respondent did not apprehend
that by proceeding in the Court of the Justice of the Peace in a
manner not violative of the terms of the alternative writ of
prohibition issued in the involved cause he was in any wise
violating the terms of the supersedeas order of the Circuit Court
and that he in no wise intended to violate such order.90
Interference with property in custodia legis
The court has stated that "The law is well settled that an interference
with property in custody of the law amounts to contempt of court.'"
In that case a deputy sheriff had taken constructive possession of chattels
on a writ of attachment and the defendants had obtained a writ of execution
on the same chattels. Knowing of the prior attachment, the defendants
nevertheless removed some of the property. The court found that the
attachment was valid, giving constructive possession, and concluding with
the statement above the court remanded the defendants to the custody
of the sheriff.
Usually the difficult question here is whether or not the property is
incustodia legis. Thus, where the defendant, in a foreclosure proceeding,
inwhich a writ of assistance and order for possession of certain real estate
had issued, removed trees and shrubbery from the property, it was necessary
to ascertain the custody of the property12 The court felt that any wrong
by the defendant was not against the court because the sheriff was responsible
for the premises since the purchaser was not yet in possession. "This
property was not in custodia legis merely because a foreclosure sale had
been had and a writ of assistance issued, and therefore the proceedings
here is not governed by the rules obtaining in such cases."193 It has thus
89.
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been held that where logs were sold to a purchaser by a receiver under the
authority of the court, they passed out of the actual or constructive custody
of the court so that any interference *With them was hot contempt of the
court concernedY4
The rule is well demonstrated in Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Bates,95
in which the contempt proceedings involved the removal of property
allegedly in custodia legis during an appeal under a supersedeas. The facts
failed to show whether or not the property removed (six bales of cotton)
was part of the property seized by the sheriff in aid of a foreclosure. The
court properly ruled that there must be a showing that the property
removed was indeed in custodia legis. Since that was impossible under
the facts of the case, the court dismissed the cause.
Cases involving attorneys
The earliest Florida case concerning attorneys states a court rule that
bears a very close resemblance to one of the present rules of practice. 6
For purposes of comparison the statement of the court follows:
No attorney or other officer of the Court shall enter himself or be
'taken as bail in any criminal case, or as security in attachment,
appeal or writ of error, or other proceeding in Court, on pain
of being considered in contempt
and of having the proceeding
7
dismissed on account thereof.
The main problem in this area relates to various procedures involved
in litigation which the court might take to be contemptuous. For
example an attorney was given money by one judge of a circuit court
while an appeal was being taken from an order of another judge of the
same court. The latter judge felt that while the appeal was pending the
other judge had no jurisdiction to disburse the funds and if the attorney
did not pay the money back into court he should be held in contempt.
Fortunately for the attorney the Supreme Court took the view that the
orders in question were not of individual judges, but rather of the circuit
court and to hold the attorney in contempt would be in excess of the
judge's authority.98
An interesting sidelight is presented in the case of Granat v. Dulbs,99
where an attorney had been fined $100 by the Supreme Court of Florida.
The court had adjourned and the attorney's petition for remission of the
fine, coupled with an explanation of his conduct, came before a different
court. The court admitted that in all likelihood the petition would have
94. Ex parte Edmondson, 68 Fla. 53, 66 So. 292 (1914).

95. 105 Fla. 378, 141 So. 316 (1932).
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been granted but felt it was without authority to remit the fine. It referred
the attorney to the State Board of Pardons and stated that either payment
or remission by the 'board would purge the contempt.
A point of contention in this area is where the attorney, following
statutory procedure by and large, attempts to have the trial judge disqualified. In one case where a writ of prohibition was sought to prevent
a county judge from determining a contempt instituted against an attorney
the court stated:
The County Judge has jurisdiction to determine in the first instance
whether or not the acts set forth in the citation for contempt
do, or do not, constitute a contempt tinder the circumstances
alleged ....
Judicial wisdom and the experiences of the past would seem to
demand that the extraordinary powers given to courts to punish
for contempts be not used except to prevent actual and direct
obstruction of, or interference with, the administration of justice,
by the acts of attorneys at law in the manner or means used
to present their controversies in the courts.
This is especially true of cases where attorneys have felt it their
duty to invoke the provisions of our statutes allowing a challenge
to be interposed against judges on the ground of their alleged
prejudice. In such cases attorneys at law, when acting in good
faith, should not be unduly embarrassed in the performance of
their official responsibilities by being subject to an atmosphere
of threatened punishment for contempt that may make the
attorney's position before the court one of being psychologically
overawed.
But even in cases of proceedings to invoke the disqualification
of a judge, the power to punish for contempts exists where there
are such uncalled for acts or wrongful conduct as amounts to an
actual and direct obstruction to, or interference with, the administration of justice, and it is only with erroneous or abusive exercises
of such power to punish for contempt that this court can be
concerned when properly called on to grant relief.10
Much the same reasoning was employed in the case of Zaeate v.
Culbreath'0 1 when the court said:
It appears to us that it would violate the fundamental principals
of justice to hold that when a litigant files a suggestion of the
disqualification of a trial judge such judge, though recusing himself
because the petition, aside from the offending allegations, alleges
sufficient grounds, may hold petitioner in contempt of court on
the ground that the judge did not, in doing an act, evince the
attitude which the suggestion alleges he did evince in doing the
act. [Petitioner alleged in one count that the judge did 'angrily
refuse to entertain said application' for reduction of bond.] 10
100. State ex rel. McGregor v. Peacock, 113 Fla. 816, 817, 152 So. 616 (1934).
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Not far removed from the disqualification cases was the case of State
ex rel. Giblin v.Sullivan. 0 3 The alleged contenior had filed an injunction
under Florida Statutes Section 823.05 (1941) to enjoin a nuisance in the form
of gambling. The defendants asked the judge to disqualify himself and
upon his refusal, the relator withdrew and under Florida Statutes Section
64.13 (1941) filed an affidavit of his reasons for so doing. Among other
things, the affidavit included charges that the judge was aiding the gamblers
and paying them a debt he owed them for his getting into office. It concluded, ". . . I wish to file another and similar bill and to have the new suit
heard and tried by a judge in whose honesty and integrity I have confidence." 10 4
The petitioner was then held in contempt and sentenced to six
months detention. The Supreme Court of Florida decided that the
petitioner should have been advised of the charge and given an opportunity
to defend himself instead of being summarily sentenced. The court went
on to say:
As a general rule, any publication tending to intimidate, influence,
impede or embarrass or obstruct courts in the due administration
of justice in matters pending before them constitutes contempt.
The filing of papers, however, which are gross and indelicate in
language, the use of scandalous language in a brief, or the making
of statements therein charging the court with improper motives
in rendering a certain line of decisions, may constitute contempt. 0 5
After further proceedings the case again appeared as Giblin v. State"",
and the court put the issue thusly:
The vital question we must now settle is whether the language
used in the motion-was privileged ....
Freedom in the exercise of a lawyer's right should not depend
on the nicety and precision of judicial judgment in choice of
remedies ....
We will not discuss the cases here because the motion was filed by
virtue of a statute which required a showing to be made as a
prerequisite to obtaining an order of dismissal ...
Vhen appellant filed the1 7motion pursuant to the statute his
statements were privileged.
It is palpably clear from these cases that what may constitute contempt
by one person, or under one set of facts, may not be so under a dissimilar
set of facts.
When the court states that the exercise of a lawyer's rights "should
not depend on the nicety and precision of judicial judgment in choice of
103.
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remedies . . .", one is reminded of the case heretofore discused under
supersedeas' 08 in which the court felt there was no contempt where the
attorney had proceeded in another court in violation of the terms of the
supersedeas order.
Another feature of these cases occurred again in Lee v. Bauer'00 where
an attorney, ordered to attend a pretrial conference failed to appear in
person and was fined with the stipulation that failure to pay would result
in dismissal. TI'he attorney paid under protest and sought certiorari to
review the order of the trial court. In much the same language as is found
in State ex rel. Giblin the court said that the attorney should not have
been summarily fined but that the proper procedure would have been
to issue a rule to show cause, thus giving him an opportunity to defend
himself.
A recent case arose when a defense attorney interviewed the prosecuting
witness in the presence of his stenographer and during the trial used the
stenographic transcript to formulate his questions during the crossexamination."10 The prosecution demanded the transcript for re-direct
examination. The defense attorney refused to hand over the paper, even
after an order of the court. The court subsequently found him guilty of
contempt. The Supreme Court held that the transcript was of a private
and unofficial nature and moreover, was private property which the trial
judge could not compel the attorney to deliver to the county solicitor.
Thus we see that an attorney may do some acts, which form an integral
part of his practice, that might ordinarily constitute contempt of court, but
in this instance are either privileged or permissive.
Contempts by witnesses
Refusal of a witness to testify before a grand jury against her husband
as to matters not involving marital confidences and as to a crime not
committed upon her person has been held contemptuous."' Thus, the
court order for the witness to testify was held lawful and ". . . the court
may resort to all measures given by the law to compel obedience thereto.
Having given petitioner an opportunity to be heard, the court had the
inherent right to punish, as for a contempt, a violation of its order to
maintain its dignity, authority, and efficiency in the proper administration
of the law.""' 2
Similarly, refusal of a witness summoned by the state's attorney to be
interrogated under oath because she was to be a witness of the defendant
in a proposed trial, though not yet served with process, has also been held
108. See note 90 supra.
109. 72 So.2d 792 (1954).
110. Whtaker v. Blackburn, 74 So.2d 794 (1954).
111. Ex Parte Beville, 58 Fla. 170, 50 So. 685 (1909).
112. Id. at 184, 50 So. at 689.
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to constitute contempt." 3 Further, this witness had been ordered by the
circuit court judge to appear and testify. She appeared, but refused to
testify. The Florida Supreme Court said that even if the defense of being
a witness in the proposed trial were good, it did not apply here since
there was no process. Further, since the state's attorney had the right
to have her testify, she was in contempt of court for refusing to do so.
The problem of reluctant witnesses who are protected by state im1 14
munity statutes has already been discussed in the section on appeals.
It was also involved in the case of Lorenzo v. Blackburn,"5 where a witness
refused to answer most of the questions put to him under oath by the
county solicitor, who was conducting an investigation. The refusal was
based on the witnesses' belief that his testimony might tend to be incriminatory. The reviewing court agreed with the circuit court that the witness
was protected by the state immunity statute" and was properly remanded
to custody.
Another type of case is typified by Mitchell v. Parrish"17 where witnesses
called by the county solicitor in an action in the criminal court of record
gave testimony which was allegedly different from that which they had
given to the solicitor previously. Upon motion by the county solicitor
the court held a hearing and adjudged the witnesses to be in contempt.
The reviewing court reversed and remanded, noting that the court below
had not been sure if the defendants had lied in court or to the solicitor.
If the latter, a separate action for perjury would have been proper. Thus,
the testimony could not be deemed contemptuous.
Persistence of the defendant in characterizing the actions of the
plaintiff in a way felt improper by the trial judge, in an assault and battery
suit, resulted in an adjudication of contempt in that case." 8 The comments of the defendant that a sound truck had been playing "some kind
of communistic, socialistic or 'Red' program, or whatever you want to
call it" caused a mistrial and when the defendant repeated such statements
at the next trial, he was held in contempt of court. The reviewing court
discharged the writ of habeas corpus and remanded the defendant to
custody.
Attempted bribery and corruption of judges, jurors and witnesses
An attempt to offer a judge money to decide a case for one of the
contestants has, of course, been held to have been contemptuous., 9 The
following statement to a man drawn for jury duty in a pending trial
was held to constitute a contempt: "You have been drawn on the jury,
113. Collier v. Baker, 155 Fla. 425, 20 So.2d 652 (1945).
114. See note 42 supra.
115. 74 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1954).
116. FLA. STAT. § 932.29 (1951).
117. 58 So.2d 683 (Fla. 1952).
118. Richey v.McLeod, 137 Fla. 281, 188 So. 228 (1939).
119. See note 71 supra.
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I see ..... Would you be interested in a proposition, a pretty good
proposition?"' 2 0 The court stated that an attempt to impugn the integrity
of a juryman was a direct attack upon the court and although jury tampering
is also a crime, the court is not thereby deprived of its inherent power
to punish contempts.
Similarly, a promise to a prospective juror that

"...

in case it is a

mistrial it is $100, and if it is an acquittal it is $200" has been held
contemptuous.' 2' But in a companion case, the statement to a prospective
juror by the alleged conteinnor that he did not want the defendant in a
criminal case electrocuted, was held ambiguous by the Supreme Court of
Florida and an oath denying the contemptuous intent was sufficient for
discharge. 122 The lower court felt that the statement was clearly contemptuous however.
On the other hand, telling a grand juror, before the grand jury
reconvened, to look out for one's interests was found to amount to a
contempt in Sloan v. Brown.12 But failure to produce legally sufficient
evidence to support the charge that one had approached the foreman of
a grand jury and offered him $300 to adjourn the jury without returning
an indictment resulted in a discharge in Stokes v. Scott." 4 While in
a companion case ample evidence supporting a similar charge resulted in
25
the defendant being remanded to custody for a contempt.1
In another case, after holding that an information was sufficient,
though the allegations made therein were based on information and belief
by the state's attorney, the court remanded the petitioner in a habeas
corpus proceeding who had been sentenced for contempt. 20" The charge
was that the defendant had failed to report information about a fugitive
from justice; that he had intimidated a witness to make the latter force
the prosecutrix to drop a rape action against the fugitive; and that lie had
offered the witness money to leave the jurisdiction.
In another case where insufficient evidence was adduced, the defendant
was discharged although he had been cited with contempt for attempting
to corrupt two veniremen. 12 And contempt has been found where one
acting as a special investigator for a defendant in a murder trial called
upon prospective jurors and asked them questions relating to their giving
the defendant a fair chance; and their views on circumstantial evidence as
grounds for conviction. 28 When one juror replied that she was acquainted
120. Baumgartner v. Joughin, 105 Fla. 335, 337, 141 So. 185, 186 (1932).
121. Wilson v. Joughin, 105 Fla. 345, 348, 141 So. 178, 180 (1932).
122. Wilson v. Joughin, 105 Fla. 353, 141 So. 182 (1932).
1231 114 Fla. 739, 154 So. 514 (1934).
124. 138 Fla. 235, 189 So. 272 (1939).
125. See note 55 supra.
126. Ex jarte Maniscalco, 153 Fla. 666, 15 So,2d 445 (1943).
127. See note 56 supra.
128. See note 6 suira.
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with the defendant's

attorneys, the investigator advised her not to

mention it.

Thus one can quickly conclude that any attempt to bribe, corrupt
or intimidate judges, jurors, grand jurors, or witnesses, is certain to constitute
contempt even though other crimes may be involved.
Contempt by publication
The earliest case in this area is In re Hayes,12 wherein an editor and
reporter of a newspaper referred to the Supreme Court of Florida, in an
action then pending, as "partisan," "stubborn,' "hostile to counsel" and
"ignorant." The court said:
This is the first time in the history of Florida that this court has
issued a rule against the editor and reporter of a newspaper to show
cause why they should not be attached for contempt because of
the publication of a libelous article impugning the integrity,
dignity, and authority of this court. 30
After reiterating that "The Supreme Court has. inrl-n',lnb
of
statutory authority, inherent power to punish for contempt of court",' 3 '
the court went on to state the rule that "Publications concerning a pending
cause which reflect upon the court constitutes contempt."' 3 2
Where an official of West Palm Beach, while in Miami, referred
to the circuit judge of his district as being "weak as water" and further
said that "our court is absolutely annulled if a man has money and influence"
the court found that since the official was in another circuit and did not
cause his statements to be printed in the newspapers, there was no contempt. 33 The court also considered that there was no real tendency of
the statements to hinder or impede the lower court and that the remarks
were directed against the judge personally and not against him in his
judicial capacity.
For contempts caused by editorials and cartoons, one should again
look at the Pennekamp cases134 in the section on appeal. It should be
noted in this connection that no attempt has been made to discuss the
constitutional law aspects of those cases or the cases in this section. Such
a discussion is clearly beyond the scope of this comment.
As we have also noted in another connection, the failure of a newspaper
editor to reveal his sources of information, for stories he has printed, to
a grand jury, constitutes contempt.'
The court noted therein that
"Members of the journalistic profession do not enjoy the privilege of confidential communication, as between themselves and their informants, and
129.
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are under the same duty to testify, when properly called upon, as any
other person." 180
Miscellaneous
Failure to pay back sums received from a court which then vacates
and sets aside its earlier judgment constitutes contempt of that court. 1 7
It has also been held that before contempt may be shown where a final
decree calls for a deed, there must be a showing that the deed was prepared
by plaintiffs in the action and that the defendant had only to execute it.1S8
This case rested upon the reasoning that defendants should !not be bound
at their peril to prepare and execute a deed in accordance with the decree
of court.
In an action for divorce the court adjudged the suing husband to be
in contempt for concealing the fact that he was under order of a domestic
relations court in New York to pay for the support of his wife. 1 9 The
Supreme Court quashed the contempt order, saying, "No disobedience of
the courts' order is intimated, no disrespect to the court is shown and the
4
administration of justice was not impeded.'
Where the law was not clear and there was no intention of violating
a final decree, proceedings instituted by the City of Miami Beach were
held not to be contemptuous in Young v. Miami Beach Improvement Co.141
The Supreme Court has also found where a nuisance action is brought
against the owner of property, that one leasing the land, who is not served
with process, though he has actual notice, is not bound by the action and
142
failure to comply with a court order therein does not constitute contempt.
CONCLUSION

Within this study an attempt has been made to make a general
survey of the law of contempts in Florida. It is obvious that no hard and
fast rules may be set down for words and actions which will constitute
contempt, however, in general the areas are clear of conflict, with the un-

fortunate exception of the appellate area.
Maintcnace of the boundaries of common decency and due respect
to the dignity, integrity and honor of the courts will serve in most cases
to preclude an adjudication of contempt. Thus, common sense and a
cursory perusal of the eases will reveal the tack to be followed. But
once one has been held in contempt the way to review by the Supreme
Court of Florida is obscure at best.
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The Supreme Court has been cognizant of this fact and has upon
occasion attempted to clarify the issue. But a scattering of divergent
cases still leaves much doubt. The problem is an immediate one, for
the Florida courts, which have handled contempt so adequately without
legislative interference in the past, have failed to perfect the machinery
of appeal.
It is therefore submitted that the normal course of appeal be open to
those held in contempt of the lower courts of the state where there has
been a final judgment. The necessity of resorting to the extraordinary
writ of habeas corpus should clearly be removed, whether the contempt
adjudication has resulted in detention or a fine.
BARTON S. UDELL

THE FLORIDA LAW OF ASSIGNMENTS
FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS
INTRODUrION

The notion of an "assignment for benefit of creditors"' is not a new
2
one. Actually the doctrine existed at common law -although the common
law procedure itself left much to be desired. Thus, the common law
approach represented a simple procedure whereby a debtor conveyed
property to a trustee, so that the latter distributed the sales proceeds
to the creditors. : The entire proceeding was therefore a mere adaptation.
of the traditional law of trusts. 4 The unsatisfactory nature of these
proceedings was evident from the fact that partial assignments were
permitted, creditors could be preferred, and the debtor could even demand
releases from consenting creditors. 6 Definitely, the creditors were placed
6
in an undesirable position. A more satisfactory system was rcquired, and
1. The term "assignment for benefit of creditors" is a popular one, and it carries
the connotation of a general assignment (in trust) for the benefit of one's creditors,
lhus, this is the term that appears in volume 6 of Corpus Juris Secondum at page 1211,
and other reference text books. Statutes, however, vary in their terminology. For
example, FLA. STAT. c. 727 (1953) uses the title "General Assignments," although
the language of the statute repeatedly contains the phrase, "assignment for benefit of
creditors." Regardless of these differences in phraseology in Florida and elsewhere,
the theory and purpose remains the same.
2. 6 C.J.S., Assignment for Benefit of Creditors § 3.
3. McMullin v. Keogh-Doyle Meat Co, 96 Colo. 298, 42 P.2d 463 (19351.

4. Thus, this trust notion is mentioned inthe early Florida case of Bellamy v.

Bellamy's Adm'r., 6 Fla. 62 (1855).
5. For a more complete discussion, see Weintraub, Levin and Sosonoff, Assignments
for the Benefit of Creditors and Competitive Systems for Liquidation of Insolvent
Estates, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 3 (1953); and BURRILL, AssINssENTS, 23-24, 171 (6th
Ed. 1894).
6. The earliest apparent Florida case involving such assignments is Holbrook v.
During the ensuing century, only about three dozen eases
Allen, 4 Fla. 87 (1851).
were adiudicated. It is therefore apparent that situations involving an assignment
for benefit of creditors rarely found themselves in the courts. This is as it should be,
since the entire arrangement is for the purpose of achieving an amicable, unlitigated
settlement.

